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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
PAUL IRONHORSE NEWKIRK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20050458-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
burglary, a third degree felony, and theft, a class A misdemeanor 
(R. 86-87). This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Can defendant prevail on his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim where the evidence that he committed burglary and 
theft was so strong as to preclude any finding of prejudice? 
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of 
the underlying trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, OT 
16-17, 12 P.3d 92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), governing burglary, 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit: 
(b) theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004), governing theft, 
provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an amended information with one 
count each of burglary, a third degree felony, and theft, a class 
A misdemeanor (R. 7-8). A jury convicted him as charged (R. 78). 
The court sentenced defendant to zero-to-five years in the Utah 
State Prison on the burglary charge and 365 days in jail on the 
theft charge, to be served concurrently at the prison (R. 83-84). 
After a hearing, the court ordered $1 in restitution (R. 106-07). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 80, 88). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In March of 2004, the owner of the Avon Apartments in Ogden 
was using one of his vacant apartments to store some furniture, 
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including an "enormously heavy" solid wood table "with a good 
antique look to it" (R. 124: 51, 52). The table, consisting of a 
tabletop and two base pieces that together formed a pedestal, had 
been taken apart for storage purposes (Id. at 53, 61).1 
Late in the month, the apartment manager, Raymond Egner, 
called the owner to say that he had found a responsible tenant 
for the unit in which the table was stored (Id. at 55) . 
Accordingly, the owner told Egner to move the heavy table into an 
adjacent garage and suggested that he ask defendant to help (Id. 
at 55, 70).2 Defendant helped with the move, and Egner paid him 
$10 (Id. at 70). Egner secured the garage door with a master 
lock, and defendant went on his way (Id. at 76) . 
The next day, while taking out the garbage, Egner noticed 
the garage door ajar (Id. at 79). He went in and discovered that 
the table was missing (Id.). Outside, he saw an adjacent 
property owner, Dave Worthen, building a fence and so walked over 
to talk to him (Id. at 81) . 
Worthen made his living restoring and renting property and 
knew defendant from the neighborhood (Id. at 95-96). He 
1
 The apartment owner testified that the table was so heavy 
that "[o]ne man couldn't possibly [move] it" (R. 124: 53). The 
manager described it as "[o]ne of the heaviest tables I've ever 
moved" (Id^ at 72). 
2
 Both men knew defendant because he had lived at the Avon 
Apartments for about a month in exchange for helping out with 
maintenance (Id. at 57, 65, 68). Although defendant had moved 
out by the time this case arose, he still spent time in the 
neighborhood (Id. at 69-70). 
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testified that one day in March, he was outside working on a 
fence, when he saw defendant at a distance of about 25 or 30 feet 
(Id. at 101). Worthen testified: 
I was just building that fence and I just 
remember just seeing him there because I 
remember he looked, he froze for a minute and 
he was carrying something with him and he'd 
taken a few steps and I walked up from in 
between the houses and came out and he just 
froze and looked at me like a deer in the 
headlights, you know, just kind of, oh man. 
And I kind of just remember that. That part 
stuck in my head and I thought, what's going 
on, you know. 
Id. at 99. Worthen testified that when he and defendant made eye 
contact and defendant froze, "it made me feel like that guy is up 
to no good" (Id. at 104) . Worthen also testified that he saw the 
table top "leaning up against the shed," which made him wonder, 
"what's that table doing all the way over here?" (Id. at 103). 
When Worthen saw defendant, he was carrying something with both 
hands, which Worthen testified "looked to me . . . like a table 
leg or something" (Id. at 102). He clarified, "It was part of 
the table. It was all torn apart it looked like. It was obvious 
that it was part of the table" (Id. at 104). Worthen said 
nothing to defendant, noting "I normally don't get into other 
people's business" (Id.). 
Returning to his fence-building, Worthen moved towards the 
front of his property to work on a section near the street (Id. 
at 105). A few minutes later, he saw a small SUV emerge from a 
driveway serving only a vacant building. He observed, "This 
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place was vacant so I knew that no one, you know, no one should 
even have been over in there on that'property" (Id. at 106). 
Worthen testified that the vehicle drove "right in front of me" 
with "the table hanging out from the rear of it, it was hanging 
out quite a ways" (Id. at 105). Worthen observed someone other 
than defendant driving the vehicle and did not see defendant 
again that day (Id. at 106). 
The next day while Worthen was working on his fence, Egner 
approached him, agitated about the missing table (Id. at 108). 
Worthen told him what he had seen, and Egner called the police 
(Id. at 81, 108). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his counsel performed deficiently by 
eliciting testimony about prior bad acts and then referencing his 
bad character during closing. He asserts prejudice because the 
evidence against him was almost entirely circumstantial and the 
improper testimony could only have inflamed the jury against him. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 10-13, 15. 
Defendant's argument fails. His counsel elicited both 
statements about prior acts on cross-examination in order to 
dispel inferences raised on direct that defendant had been 
involved in drug trafficking and the sale of stolen merchandise. 
That counsel's legitimate trial strategy did not produce the 
anticipated result does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Similarly, counsel's statements to the jury in closing 
5 
does not amount to deficient performance but rather constitutes a 
rational strategy intended to diminish the import of defendant's 
past by candidly acknowledging it had been less than perfect. 
Moreover, defendant has failed to establish any prejudice. 
He argues that because the evidence against him was 
circumstantial, the inflammatory nature of his prior bad conduct 
was enough to turn the jury's verdict against him. 
Circumstantial evidence, however, is not an inferior form of 
evidence, as defendant suggests. When, as here, the overwhelming 
circumstantial evidence and the many reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from it establish every element of theft and 
burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL CLAIM ULTIMATELY FAILS 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE THAT HE 
COMMITTED BURGLARY AND THEFT IS SO 
STRONG AS TO PRECLUDE ANY FINDING 
OF PREJUDICE 
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial. He contends that his counsel performed 
deficiently by improperly eliciting evidence about prior bad acts 
from two witnesses and then referencing his bad character during 
closing argument. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-12. He also asserts 
that this evidence was "highly prejudicial" because the case "was 
based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence" and the 
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improperly adduced evidence "could have only served to inflame 
the jury and show that he has a bad character." Id. at 13, 15.3 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a 
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 4 66 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 
1990) . 
When reviewing trial counsel's work to assess deficient 
performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 
681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). "If a rational basis for 
counsel's performance can be articulated, [this Court] will 
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 
461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance 
claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or 
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. 
3
 Defendant also briefly references the possibility of 
plain error by the trial court. See Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. 
Noting that defense counsel himself elicited the allegedly 
damaging testimony, however, he properly concludes that the 
invited error doctrine precludes the applicability of a plain 
error analysis. See id. at 17. 
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Defendant first complains that his counsel performed 
deficiently by raising the issue of defendant's involvement with 
drugs by asking Egner, the apartment manager, if he had seen 
anything indicative of illegal drugs in defendant's apartment. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11. Contrary to defendant's assertion, 
however, defense counsel raised the issue only after the owner of 
the apartment complex had testified on direct that a building on 
his corner was rife with drug-related traffic, which had caused 
several of his tenants to move, and that defendant was evicted 
because of excessive traffic between his apartment and the 
building on the corner. See R. 50, 58. A reasonable inference 
from this testimony was that defendant was also involved in drug 
trafficking. Under such circumstances, defense counsel made a 
strategic choice to pursue the issue, in an attempt to 
disassociate his client from the neighborhood drug activity. The 
law is well-settled that "[a] lawyerfs legitimate exercise of 
judgment in the choice of trial strategy that does not produce 
the anticipated result does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel." State v. Wvnia, 754 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah App. 
1988)(citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983); 
State v, McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1976)). 
Defendant also complains that his counsel performed 
deficiently by referencing his "questionable character" in 
closing argument. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-13. Defense counsel's 
comments, however, could well have been part of a trial strategy 
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to diminish the import of defendant's past by candidly 
acknowledging that defendant had a "tough life" and had made some 
"bad choices" (R. 124: 140). Because these comments also fall 
within a legitimate trial strategy, they do not constitute 
objectively deficient performance. Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468. 
Another question of deficient performance is presented by 
defense counsel's choice to probe earlier testimony from the 
neighbor, Dave Worthen, that he knew defendant from the 
neighborhood and that occasionally defendant had offered to sell 
him various items. See R. 124: 97-98. Worthen had testified 
that defendant tried to sell him a light fixture that defendant 
said was surplus from the apartment complex as well as a carpet 
shampooer that defendant said had been replaced by a new one 
(Id.). Defense counsel, reasonably surmising that this testimony 
raised an inference that defendant was selling stolen 
merchandise, sought to dispel that inference by asking Worthen if 
anyone had told him the items were stolen (Id. at 113). While 
the inference of wrong-doing in the original witness response may 
be somewhat weaker than in the exchange referencing drug 
trafficking, counsel's attempt to dispel it nonetheless 
constituted a legitimate trial strategy for minimizing its 
importance.4 That the strategy produced an unexpected result 
4
 When this strategic choice did not play out as defense 
counsel anticipated, he sought to mitigate any potential damage 
by noting in closing argument, "People do what they have to do to 
survive sometimes. It doesn't make it right but it has nothing 
to do with this case" (R. 124: 142). 
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does not negate its valid strategic purpose. See Wynia, 754 P.2d 
at 672 (citations omitted). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that defense counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
when he elicited further testimony about the carpet shampooer, 
the dispositive issue remains whether, without the error, 
defendant would have enjoyed a reasonable likelihood of a better 
trial outcome. See, e.g., Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. Here, the 
crux of defendant's argument seems to be that because the 
evidence against him was circumstantial, the inflammatory nature 
of his prior bad conduct was enough to tip the jury's verdict 
against him. See Br. of Aplt. at 15-16.5 Without the improper 
evidence, he asserts, the outcome of his trial would likely have 
been more favorable. See id. at 8. 
A reviewing court determines whether deficient performance 
results in prejudice by considering "the totality of the evidence 
[and] taking into account such factors as whether the errors 
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect 
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. 
In this case, Worthen testified on direct that defendant had 
approached him about buying a carpet shampooer. Then, on cross, 
5
 Defendant makes no distinction between the prior conduct 
involving selling stolen merchandise and his involvement in drug 
trafficking. Defendant merely argues generally that each 
instance of counsel's conduct was equally prejudicial. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 16. 
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defense counsel elicited testimony that the police later had also 
approached him, inquiring about a stolen carpet shampooer. 
Because defendant was on trial for theft, the testimony implying 
that defendant had been involved in a previous theft plainly did 
not help his case. The inquiry into prejudice, however, does not 
stop here. See id. The reviewing court must also examine "how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
Defendant's argument fails because he mistakenly relies on 
circumstantial evidence as an inherently less compelling form of 
evidence that more easily gives rise to prejudice. He fails to 
appreciate not only the strength of the evidence against him but 
also this Court's role in assessing that evidence: 
When, as here, the evidence consists solely 
of undisputed, circumstantial evidence, the 
role of the reviewing court is to determine 
(1) whether there is any evidence that 
supports each and every element of the crime 
charged, and (2) whether the inferences that 
can be drawn from that evidence have a basis 
in logic and reasonable human experience 
sufficient to prove each legal element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty 
verdict is not legally valid if it is based 
solely on inferences that give rise to only 
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993); accord State v. 
Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998). 
Here, defendant was convicted of burglary and theft for 
unlawfully entering a building and intentionally taking a table, 
without authority, that he knew did not belong to him. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202, 76-6-404. Applying the first prong of the 
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Workman test, the evidence supporting the elements of burglary 
and theft was substantial. The owner testified that he and the 
manager, Flay Egner, were the only two people authorized to enter 
the storage shed (R. 124: 57). Defendant helped Egner move the 
table, in three large pieces, from the apartment to the shed (Id. 
at 69, 72). Egner then locked the garage with a master lock to 
which only he had a key (Id. at 76-77). The next day, Egner 
noticed the door was ajar, the lock was gone, and the table was 
missing (Id. at 80, 90). An adjacent property owner, Dave 
Worthen, told Egner that he had seen defendant on the previous 
day carrying a large table leg in both arms away from the garage 
(Id. at 102, 104). Worthen also said that when he and defendant 
made eye contact, defendant froze "like a deer in the 
headlights," causing Worthen to "feel like [defendant was] up to 
no good" (Id. at 99). Worthen also noticed the table top 
outside, leaning up against a garage, and wondered why it was 
there (Id. at 103). Just a few minutes later, he observed a 
small SUV driven by someone other than defendant drive by him 
with the table hanging out from the rear (Id. at 105-06). The 
vehicle had emerged from a driveway that accessed only a vacant 
building (Id. at 116). Egner did not see defendant in the 
neighborhood after the vehicle drove by (Id. at 106). This 
evidence plainly supports all the elements of burglary and theft. 
Applying the second prong of the Workman test, the 
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence are so logical as 
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to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the 
crimes. First, defendant knew that the table was in the shed and 
that the shed was secured by a single master lock. Second, it is 
reasonable to infer that defendant cut off the lock to get into 
the shed. Third, Worthen's testimony that defendant froze "like 
a deer in the headlights" when Worthen saw him carrying the table 
leg gives rise to the reasonable inference that defendant froze 
because he had been "caught" by Worthen in the act of stealing 
the table and that his "freezing" and his "deer in the 
headlights" look arose, as Worthen suspected, precisely because 
he was engaged in unlawful activity. Fourth, testimony that the 
table top was too heavy for one person to move and that an 
unidentified person was driving the SUV gives rise to an 
inference that this person was also involved in the commission of 
the crimes and that he helped defendant remove the heavy table 
top from the garage and load it into the vehicle. Fifth, 
Worthen's testimony that he did not see defendant after the SUV 
drove by gives rise to the inference that defendant left in the 
vehicle with the driver. 
The strong circumstantial evidence in this case, combined 
with the logical inferences rooted in human experience, support 
defendant's convictions for burglary and theft. This is not a 
case giving rise to only a "remote or speculative possibilit[y] 
cf guilt." Workman, 852 P.2d at 985. In this case, the State 
has proven defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Thus, even assuming arguendo that counsel performed 
deficiently when he elicited testimony that defendant had tried 
to sell a stolen carpet shampooer, defendant suffered no 
prejudice as a result. Even without the damaging testimony, he 
enjoyed no better prospect of a more favorable outcome to his 
trial. Consequently, his ineffective assistance claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count each of burglary and theft. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _4__ d aY o f February, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Dee W. Smith, The Public Defender Association of 
Weber County, 2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300, Ogden, Utah 
84401, this _^_ day of February, 2006. 
T&MMJI-
15 
